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Abstract 
 
 This paper offers a theoretical model which focuses on cultural bargaining 
behavior. It is based on an intercultural negotiation framework of activity-based cultural 
types (Ott, 2011). The complexities of international negotiations are analyzed from a 
multi-active bargaining perspective which considers negotiation-is-an-art model. The 
results show the multi-active bargaining types from a seller and a buyer perspective. 
The differences in international negotiation behavior show the problems of cultural 
collisions. The possibility to circumvent these clashes is at the core of this article. The 
analysis proves useful as the different time perceptions, cultural activity levels and the 
resulting strategic behavior are clearly related to the deadlocks, stalemates, break-ups 
and agreements experienced in real-life scenarios. The application of the model to UK-
Malaysian negotiation experiments is an example of the robustness of the theoretical 
results. This paper offers solutions to negotiations in an intercultural context and opens 
the black box of the uncertainty about cultural incompatibilities. 
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Introduction 
 
 ‘Consider first a Bazaar: a buyer would arrive at a shop, bargain with the seller 
and might after a while indicate that he is about to leave and look for another shop. It is 
commonplace for the seller to shout after the leaving customer and make a last price 
offer. Indeed, no self-respecting seller would allow a customer to leave without making 
a last offer (Shaked, 1994, p. 421/422)’.  
 
 Modeling a bazaar is one way of showing interactions at the marketplace which 
reaches from such immediate levels of co-operation and conflict to more sophisticated 
negotiations of virtual high-tech bargaining scenarios. Contrary to Shaked (1994) who 
moved away from bazaar to model high-tech market bargaining, Rapaport et al. (1995) 
used a model of a ‘Tunisian Bazaar’ mechanism. As these papers show a similarity in 
the bargaining procedures of haggling bargainers, we use this as a starting point to show 
differences in the first offer, acceptance and rejection between different groups of 
cultures. In a bazaar the incompatibilities of different cultural bargaining types are most 
obvious between cultures with a haggling approach, on the one hand, and those with a 
short-term or those with a more patient approach, on the other hand. 
 
 One thing which is common to all modes of negotiating is a cultural cognitive 
program, which accompanies interaction and procedures in a globalized business world. 
The outcome of international and intercultural negotiations for managerial purposes is 
strongly determined by an inherent set of different values, beliefs, attitudes and norms 
which is often difficult to detect and about which it is difficult to be certain. The 
necessary evidence for strengthening the cultural negotiation types came from empirical 
investigations (Graham, 1985; Graham and Mintu-Wimsat, 1992; Graham et al, 1995, 
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Salacuse, 1999; Chaney and Martin, 2004, Adair and Brett, 2004 and 2005). These 
studies pointed to different bargaining strategies of US, Japanese and Brazilian cultures.  
 
 In a recent publication Ott (2011) introduced an intercultural negotiation 
framework which considers the clash between linear-active, multi-active and reactive 
bargaining strategies. This paper develops the concept presented in the cultural activity 
framework (Ott, 2011) further and assumes a one-sided incomplete information scenario 
for sellers and buyers with a multi-active approach. The characteristics of a haggling 
approach can generally be seen in a high offer, frequent rejection of offers and a longer 
bargaining horizon (Ott, 2011). Ott (2011) provides a basis for further research. The 
cooperation/conflict scenarios are not considered in an incomplete information setting, 
which can be very likely in import/export negotiations or any other Foreign Direct 
Investment cases when a host culture is unsure about the expat managers or MNE HQ 
relationship with their subsidiary.  
 
 This paper contributes to the literature of international negotiations in several 
ways. First, we try to emphasize the multi-active bargaining behavior in buyer-seller 
negotiations. Second, we integrate these cultural activity types with bargaining games of 
one-sided incomplete information. Third, we apply our theoretical analysis to a UK-
Malaysian experiment. Though the paper uses a formal analysis, the propositions are 
followed by the intuition to show the practical relevance.  
 
International Negotiations 
 
 In this article, we continue in the tradition of Raiffa (1982, with Richarson and 
Metcalfe, 2002) and Sebenius (1992, 2009) who called for negotiation analysis which 
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integrates theoretical bargaining models with real-life negotiation scenarios. Co-
operation and conflict are the essence of negotiations and are also the point of tension in 
game theoretical reasoning. We need to consider a dynamic perspective with the 
respective solution concept to combine the descriptive and prescriptive negotiation 
perspectives.  
 
 The literature review deals with the theoretical underpinning of international 
negotiation styles and bargaining models of one-sided incomplete information. It 
therefore combines both streams of literature with an empirical negotiation background 
and a theoretical bargaining approach.  
 
International Negotiation Styles 
 
 The literature of international negotiations is replete with examples of 
negotiation styles (Graham, 1985; Ghauri and Usunier, 2003; Gelfand and Brett, 2004; 
Thompson, Neale and Sinaceur, 2004, inter alia) of different distinct cultural patterns 
such as US, Japanese and Brazilians. The scope of literature considers the art and 
science of negotiations, the psychology of negotiations and the international business 
and international relations perspectives on negotiations. A variety of negotiation models 
and frameworks deal with negotiation behavior which can be found in the international 
business literature (Fayerweather and Kapoor, 1976; Tung, 1982; Weiss and Stripp, 
1985; Graham, 1987; Weiss, 1993, Ghauri and Usunier, 2003, Ott, 2011), game theory 
literature (Schelling, 1960; Raiffa, 1982) and social psychology literature (Deutsch, 
1973; Pruitt 1981; Gelfand and Brett, 2004). Combining culture, negotiation and game 
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theory is the focus of this paper. We consider first the theoretical underpinning for 
culture and negotiation styles in that respect.  
 
 Understanding cultural behavior and co-operation (Hall,1976; Hofstede, 1991, 
2001; Wageman and Baker, 1997; Tompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1997; Chen et al., 
1998; House, et.al, 2004; Fang, 2006) explains differences in negotiation styles and 
outcomes have been explicated for many decades. Whether cooperative or non-
cooperative strategies are used in negotiation is determined by cultural evolution and 
schemes (Calabuig and Olcina, 2009; Chuah, et al. 2007; Cordes et al. 2008;  Hennig-
Schmidt et al., 2008). The negotiation process belonging to the most basic cultural 
programs has been analyzed in experiments and it can be considered as a dynamic 
concept. We therefore use a time lens to show the differences and more importantly its 
implications for intercultural negotiations. 
 
 Usunier’s (2003a; 2003b) contrasts time models between the Western (linear, 
economic time) and Eastern Asian time patterns (cyclical-integrated time). In general, 
the time horizon directly or indirectly plays a crucial role in international negotiations – 
especially the contrast between the long-term orientation of Asian, Arab and African 
cultures influence negotiations versus the short-term perspectives of Western Societies. 
Ellingsen and Johanneson (2009) contrasted the short-termist ‘Time is money’ 
perspective with the one of anthropologists who insisted that the ‘convertibility of time 
and money is circumscribed by norms and values’ (p.96). Their results with Swedish 
participants in an experiment showed that subjects are more prone to make non-
monetary sacrifices than to make monetary ones. Further there are different degrees of 
long-term and short-term orientation. Uncertainty about these types is a characteristic of 
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international bargaining. Compared to the literature on negotiation styles of US 
Americans, Japanese and Chinese, the way cultural behavior affects negotiation 
strategies of multi-active players has not been analyzed extensively so far. Robinson et 
al. (2000) found clear differences in the bargaining tactics between Asian, Latin 
American, USA and Western European groups on the five factor scales. The five factors 
comprised competitive bargaining, attacking opponent’s network, false promises, 
misrepresentation and inappropriate info gathering which showed clear differences in 
cultural patterns. It becomes clear that using a multi-active bargaining perspective in 
contrast to the Western and Far Eastern behavior would open the black box of cultural 
clashes in negotiations.  
 
 Whereas Francis (1991), Olekalns and Weingart (2008) and Adair et al (2009) 
stress the tendency to adapt and overcompensate when negotiating with cultures of 
different negotiation schemes. This paper suggests that there is a cognitive part in the 
core of a bargaining game which will tend to lead to intercultural clashes even with the 
best intentions to find a cooperative solution. This is particularly clear in a bazaar when 
buyer-seller negotiations clash due to different concepts and styles. Building on an 
activity type focus for intercultural cognitive perspective together with a bargaining 
model, this paper stresses the multi-active section of the conceptual framework of 
intercultural negotiations (Ott, 2011). It articulates two levels of analysis (seller and 
buyer perspective) and comprises three distinct types of cultural strategic behavior 
(linear-active/US, multi-active/Brazil, reactive/Japan). We use Ott (2011) to further 
develop a model for multi-active bargainers colliding with other cultural activity types.  
 
Bargaining Literature 
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 The classical literature of bargaining games with one-sided incomplete 
information comprises articles by Rubinstein (1982 and 1985), Ausubel and Deneckere 
(1989a and b), Admati and Perry (1987), Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), Crampton 
(1985), Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983), Fudenberg, Levine and Tirole (1985), 
Myerson (1985). Admati and Perry (1987, p. 321) pointed out that in the standard 
bargaining game a fixed time between offers is specified exogenously whereas in real 
bargaining situations bargainers may employ a number of strategies to affect the length 
of time between offers. It could be that the bargainers do not face each other throughout 
the bargaining process (communication by phone etc.), a player can disappear for some 
time for various reasons or could close communication channels when it is his turn to 
make, receive or respond to an offer. Gul and Sonnenschein (1985, p. 5) stated ‘delay to 
agreement can only be explained by the time between offers’. Endogenous time 
between offers can be an important strategic variable in bargaining with incomplete 
information which was analyzed in Rubinstein (1985) and Admati and Perry (1987). 
Each player can delay her response as long as she wishes (beyond an exogenously fixed 
minimum time unit) when it is her turn to respond to an offer. There is the assumption 
that until an offer has been made by the relevant player, the other player must remain 
passive and cannot revise previous offers. Using Ott (2011) and applying her framework 
to a situation in which the seller is multi-active and delay is short in order to reverse 
Admati and Perry’s (1987) delay assumption. There will be uncertainty about the buyer 
who might react with long-term or short-term valuation of the bargaining process. A 
bargaining game with haggling is therefore the theoretical underpinning for a bazaar 
setting.  
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 Theoretically haggling has been rarely investigated, but there are a few 
experiments which analyze haggling in experiments (Cason, Friedman and Milam, 
2003; Milam, 2006). The outcome is that there are inefficiencies. The insights gained 
are derived from Rapoport et al. (1995) and Balakrishnan, and Eliashberg (1995) which 
combine bargaining models with an experimental design. As their results show 
similarities to this article the next step is a formal model for the cultural types of 
bargaining. The proposition of a new way of analyzing international negotiations 
enables the study of the clash of cultural types. A framework of a one-sided incomplete 
information setting enlarges Ott (2011) to the degree that a multi-active seller (in a 
bazaar) meets a buyer whose cultural profile is uncertain and vice versa.  
 
Multi-active Bargaining Behavior –Values and Costs- 
 
 The following bargaining games show the outcomes when the seller or the buyer 
offers first. These scenarios are dealt with from a formal approach bundling a multi-
active seller moving first and similarly for the multi-active buyer moving first. Hence, 
we aim to show the dynamics in international negotiations considering the different 
cultural activity types.  
 
 Ott (2011) draws on Lewis (1999, 2006) categories of linear-active, multi-active 
and reactive cultures and created an intercultural negotiation framework. Three main 
cultural activity groups are distinguished: task-oriented, highly organized planners 
(linear-active culture); people-oriented, loquacious ‘inter-relators’ (multi-active 
culture); introvert, respect-oriented listeners (reactive culture). Ott (2011) related these 
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cultural activity types with the empirical evidence to design a bargaining framework. 
Table 1 outlines the empirical evidence regarding the key properties of the three types.  
 
Table 1 here 
 
 This paper examines the clashes of pure types (such as US-Americans, Japanese 
and Brazilians) analyzed in the international business literature and emphasizes the 
differences between the respective bargaining behaviors. Consistent with the choice of 
pure types, empirical studies in international negotiations focus strongly on distinctive 
US and Japanese negotiations (Adair and Brett, 2004; 2005 and Adair, Weingart and 
Brett, 2007) and more recently on US and Chinese (Lee, Guang and Graham, 2006) 
negotiations. Other cultures such as Brazilian, Spanish and Israeli are also often 
included to show US and Japanese bargaining (Graham, 1985; Graham and Mintu-
Wimsat, 1992; Graham et al, 1995; Roth et al. 1991; Brett and Okumura, 1998; 
Salacuse, 1999, Adair and Brett, 2004, 2005, Chaney and Martin, 2004). Adler et al 
(1987) distinguish between the US, Canadian and Mexican negotiation style. Using the 
cultural activity typology the difference between the bargaining patterns of linear-active 
(US, Canada) and multi-active (Mexican) behavior early on is striking. Volkema (1999) 
emphasizes similarly the difference between US and Brazilian negotiations, which can 
as well classify as linear-active versus multi-active negotiations. In 2004, Volkema 
(2004) stresses his results with an even larger dataset, but we can still classify the 
linear-active, multi-active and reactive negotiators of his nine country analysis.  
In the intercultural negotiation framework, cultural differences in bargaining 
behavior are connected to the range of the initial offer, the frequency of rejection, 
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strategies of concession-making and the valuation of time. Figure 1 shows the 
conceptual approach. 
 
Insert Figure 1 here 
 
 Different bargaining strategies occur because of setting a reasonable high price 
in order to get the desired price due to the duration of the negotiation period and to the 
resulting discounted value. For instance, a straight- forward approach and the 
anticipation of a short bargaining period may result in a lower initial offer and lower 
costs of time.  
 
 The negotiation rules include the range of price p and costs of time as a discount 
factor , which will be introduced in combination into this model. For our multi-active 
bargaining analysis, the properties of the model, thus, comprise the linear-active, multi-
active and reactive type of player created in the framework (Ott, 2011):  
 
 Assumption and Property 1 (Multi-active Players): Multi-active players consider 
bargaining as art and a have long-term perspective in bargaining. Emotional bargaining 
means a high frequency of ‘Nos’ or rejection of offers. The multi-active player has a 
medium-term orientation 1 , the time between offers and concessions is short 
10  , the bargaining costs are high cH(t) and the length of negotiations covers a 
long period t ={0,  }. 
 
 Assumption and Property 2 (Linear-active Players): Linear-active players have 
high costs of bargaining and time is costly which leads to a short-term perspective. The 
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linear-active player has a short-term perspective 0 , the offers and concessions are 
posed with a short delay 0 , the costs of bargaining are cL(t) low due to the short 
time horizon and finally the length of negotiations covers a short period t ={0, N}. 
Acceptance leads to the end of the game and rejection to a small number of counter-
offer and sometimes as well to the end of the game. 
 
 Assumption and Property 3 (Reactive Players): Reactive players have a long-
term perspective in bargaining and opting out after a long period of bargaining is 
possible. The reactive bargaining type has a long-term perspective 1 , however the 
delay between offers can be long 1 , the bargaining costs are high cH(t), outside 
options are relevant and even possible after acceptance and the end of the game can be t 
={0,  }.  
 
 As we can now see it is important to distinguish between the multi-active and 
the reactive type due to their different strategic concept of delay regarding counter-
offers and concessions. This means that we can capture the role of ‘No’ and the 
proneness to rejection in mathematical terms. The conceptualization of the clashes 
between these pure types can be seen in the following table. For the purpose of this 
paper, the main focus is on multi-active bargaining behavior and the clashes with 
linear-active and reactive types which are highlighted in the grey-shaded area from 
Table 2 in Ott (2011).  
 
Table 2 here 
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 Let us now consider the standard buyer-seller model to show how the 
reservation price of the seller and buyer influences the agreed price or contracted price 
(Raiffa, 1982). In the standard buyer-seller negotiation literature (Raiffa, 1982, Raiffa et 
al. 2002; Sebenius, 1992, 2009; Rapaport et al. 1995) there is no distinction between 
different cultural ways of bargaining and using differences in initial offers and 
bargaining horizon. Our model adds to the standard model the differences in the value 
of time v (‘time is money’, ‘negotiation is an art’, ‘patience is a virtue’) and the 
differences of the costs c of the bargaining process which correlate with the differences 
in cultural patterns of negotiating.  
 
The initial offer of a linear-active bargainer is smaller than the one of the multi-
active and reactive players LMR ppp  .The counter-offer of a linear-active, multi-
active and reactive player shows the relationship 
***
LMR ppp  ; },max{
*
RRR cvp   
},max{* MMM cvp  },max{
*
LLL cvp   which maximizes the time and costs of 
bargaining. The value of the time horizon v considers the value ]1,0[v  as a function of 
bargaining horizon v( i ) in which the discount factor i  symbolizes patience and 
impatience: )()()( LMR vvv   . The costs of bargaining for a certain amount of 
time can be written as )()()( LMR ccc   . 
 
Bargaining Models  
 
 The bargaining game starts at time zero, when it is the seller’s turn to make an 
offer. Players make alternating offers until they reach an agreement. A response to an 
offer involves either an acceptance or a counteroffer, and it is made within no shorter 
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than a given length of time. The response can be made at any time afterwards. The other 
player remains passive until an acceptance or counteroffer has been announced. The 
original offer cannot be revised after it has been made. The first offer in the game can be 
made at any time 0t . Since the acceptance of an offer ends the game, a relevant 
history for the game is a sequence of unacceptable offers and a sequence of time 
between offers.  
 
 As this paper draws upon Rapoport et al (1995) and Balakrishnan and Eliashberg 
(1995), the trading rules are used and reshaped for the purpose of creating a model for 
understanding multi-active buyer-seller bargaining games. This paper’s bargaining rules 
are also adopted from Fudenberg and Tirole (1983), Sobel and Takahashi (1983), 
Cramton (1984), Fudenberg et al (1985), Rubinstein (1985), Gul and Sonnenschein 
(1986), Admati and Perry (1987), Ausubel and Deneckere (1989a, b, 1992).  
 
 The following scenarios are applications of the bargaining games. Propositions 
and corollaries are adapted to the activity-based types of bargaining with one-sided 
uncertainty about the reservation values, such as the bargaining costs and the value of 
time, and about the strategic delay. Using the sequential equilibrium situation, we move 
to the incomplete information situation by using the dynamic approach by introducing 
‘Nature’ as a dummy player for the one-sided incomplete information scenarios below. 
We consider the bargaining power derived from the first move of offering a price or 
making a proposal (either as a seller or as a buyer). This means that we can use, as well, 
uncertainty about the type of the first mover and suggest how to move as a multi-active 
player in a response scenario, which leads to a seller-offer game and buyer-offer game. 
We adapt Rapaport et al (1995) to our situation by stating our trading rules: (1) Private 
 14 
information on one side; (2) No communication is allowed except price proposal, 
acceptance and rejection (3) The parties can be patient and impatient to enjoy the fruits 
of agreement, (note this is a deviation from Rapaport et al (1995). In addition, we 
consider what might happen when both the informed and uninformed party make offers. 
We emphasize Rapaport et al.’s proposition of impatience as ‘costs of bargaining’ is 
considered for our linear-active bargainers. Furthermore, an important feature is that the 
influence of time on bargaining could take on different forms. It can be reflected in the 
discounting function if the players discount future benefits. Secondly, the utility of 
agreement may change with the date. Finally, there is usually fixed cost of bargaining 
that recurs at each stage of the negotiation. In the present paper we study the variable 
costs of bargaining in terms of uncertainty regarding the time horizon. Our discount 
value is the factor of time and ./])1(1[ 2/1 rr  
 
 We add to Rapaport et al.’s work the idea that there are different activity types 
of sellers and buyers and the clash of culture of these differences has an impact on the 
length of bargaining, and on the likelihood of break-ups, stalemates and success. 
Therefore, we can see the agreement zone is influenced by the height of the first offer, 
the concessions, the costs and the value of bargaining as an indication of the differences 
of time horizons. As an additional step to capture the differences of activity types, we 
choose to analyze the cultural clashes with the notation and logic of a process-oriented 
negotiation analysis introduced by  
 
 Let us, therefore, represent each player’s problem as choosing the maximum 
(minimum) level to demand (offer), subject to the constraints. We can therefore add 
what we have come up with in the section above relating to Characterization of Types 
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and develop our models, respectively. This would mean that the seller will maximize 
the demand (price minus costs (p-c)) and the buyer will minimize the offer (v-p). The 
height of initial prices, the length of bargaining and the costs and value functions will 
all differ according to the cultural types.  
 
Multi-active Seller Games 
 
Let there be a multi-active seller with payoff MM
S
M cpU  , the index M 
refers to the price margin given which is between 20-50% and uncertainty about the 
buyer’s value of the bargaining process with payoff pvU i
B
LMR  )( . 
 
 Proposition 1: If a multi-active seller makes the initial offer in a seller-offer-
game, then the uncertainty about the type of the buyer will lead to a bargaining game 
with incomplete information. 
Proof. (1) The multi-active seller makes an initial offer pM. The first situation 
occurs when a multi-active seller sets pM and expects the buyer to negotiate over this 
price by rejecting or making a counter-offer. (2) Nature chooses type of buyer to be 
either linear-active, multi-active or reactive ),,()( RMLi vv   . (3) The buyer 
accepts or rejects the offer. (4) Acceptance ends the game. In general, we have the 
following relationship of reservation values to show acceptance of an offer pv i )( . 
(5) Rejection leads to another offer by the multi-active seller which will occur in a very 
short period of time. This is in a seller-offer game. The multi-active seller will continue 
with the game by offering again. The payoffs will be 
))(,( pvUcpU i
B
LMRMM
S
M    
 16 
 
When a multi-active seller offers price Mp , then the uncertainty about the buyer 
leads in cultural terms to differences in the valuation of the bargaining process with the 
initial offer. This means that, for linear-active and reactive types, the initial price offer 
does not fit to their private values. Therefore, rejection of the offer from the linear-
active buyer will lead to another offer by the multi-active seller in the way that haggling 
lowers the initial price offer over time. However, the reactive player will not reject to 
due to losing face, but will delay the process – thus going counter to the strategic 
process of bargaining of multi-active players. Differences in the valuation lead to 
stalemates and break-ups. Figure 2 shows the results of Corollary 1a, b and c. 
 
 Corollary 1a (Brazilian Seller – American Buyer): If a multi-active seller and a 
linear-active buyer bargain over the price of a good they want to trade, there will be a 
conflict due to the low frequency of offers/counteroffers and a high probability of 
acceptance of a high price without further bargaining.  
 
 Result: ML pv )(  and the value of the bargaining process is short for the 
linear-active player, therefore the costs are lower for the linear-active buyer to negotiate 
for a short period, whereas pM has a higher margin for the bargaining process. If the 
linear-active accepts, then she pays a higher price than necessary.  
 
Insert Figure 2 here 
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 Corollary 1b (Brazilian Seller – Italian Buyer). If a multi-active seller offers to a 
multi-active buyer, then rejection by a multi-active buyer will lead to a counter-offer in 
a very short period of time.  
 Result: MM pv )( and the cultural costs of bargaining are equal. This is the 
benchmark case for all other cultural models. 
 Corollary 1c (Brazilian Seller – Japanese Buyer): If a multi-active seller and a 
reactive buyer bargain over the price of a good they want to trade, there will a long  
period of bargaining.  
Intuition: MR pv )( and the value of the bargaining process is longer than the 
offered price pM can cover. The multi-active seller will accept earlier than culturally 
perceived by the reactive player. It will be too costly to hold out for the multi-active..  
 
Multi-active Buyer Games 
 
Let there be the payoff function of a multi-active buyer MM
B
M pvU   and a 
randomized seller with )( i
S
LMR cpU  . There is uncertainty about the seller’s 
bargaining horizon and cost of bargaining.  
 
Proposition 2: If a multi-active buyer makes the initial offer in a buyer-offer 
game, then the uncertainty about the type of the seller will lead to a sequential 
equilibrium  
Proof. (1) The multi-active buyer makes an initial offer pM. (2) Nature chooses the 
type of the buyer being either linear-active, multi-active or reactive 
),,()( RMLi cc   . (3) The linear-active, multi-active or reactive seller will either 
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accept or reject. (4) Acceptance will end the game. In general, we can write )( icp   
to reach an agreement. It is very unlikely that the multi-active seller will accept the 
offer. (5) Rejection will lead to another offer by the buyer in a buyer-offer game or a 
counter-offer in an alternating offer game. Rejection by the seller will lead to a quick 
succession of another buyer offer in case of the buyer-offer game. The game continues. 
The payoffs will be ))(,( i
S
LMRMM
B
M cpUpvU   
 
If the buyer moves first and offers Mp , uncertainty about costs of bargaining for the 
seller is relevant and determines the outcome. This means that the initial price offer is 
higher with respect to the costs of the bargaining horizon and its coverage. This means 
that the linear-activ seller has lower costs of bargaining and the reactive seller has 
higher costs and a longer horizon to cover. There is again a high probability of 
dissatisfaction with the bargaining procedure for the multi-active and linear-active 
partners and a high probability of failure for the multi-active and reactive due to 
incompatibilities. 
 
Insert Figure 3 here 
 
 Corollary 2a Brazilian Buyer – American Seller: If a multi-active buyer offers 
price pM, the linear-active seller either accept or reject in a short period of time.  
 Result: )( LM cp  and higher costs of bargaining of the multi-active seller due 
to longer time horizon will clash with a shorter horizon of the linear-active buyer who 
will accept or reject in a shorter time period. Acceptance and rejection of the buyer will 
end the game. 
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 Corollary 2b: Brazilian Buyer – Arab Seller. If a multi-active buyer offers price 
pM, the multi-active seller will reject in a short period of time and it leads to a quick 
offer-counter-offer sequence with the intention to continue in an alternating offer game 
of haggling. 0)(  MM cp   
 Result: )( MM cp  and same time horizon of multi-active sellers and buyers 
will have similar costs of bargaining. 
 
 Corollary 2c: Brazilian Buyer – Japanese Seller If a multi-active buyer offers 
price pM, and rejection by the reactive seller (if it happens) will lead to a counter-offer 
within a long period of time or a sequence of offers by the buyer. 
 Result: )( RM cp   and longer time horizon of reactive players will lead to 
higher costs of bargaining, but they are covered partially by the price of the multi-active 
buyer.  
 
 In summary, the results of multi-active bargaining in table 3 show the 
differences between different time horizons, values and costs in international 
negotiations.  
 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
An Application to Bargaining in the Bazaar 
 
 As another application of our model to export-import negotiations, we show how 
negotiators from the UK and Malaysia would behave in such a negotiation game.  
 20 
 
Insert Figure 4 here 
 
 Figure 4 shows the application of the differences in negotiating to a UK-Malaysian 
negotiation (Chuah, 2007, 2009) only over several periods instead of an ultimatum game. It 
shows that the UK importer-exporter relationship is clearly a short-termist (linear-active) 
approach and the Malaysian importer-exporter relationship is situated in the multi-active 
negotiation approach. Bringing together UK and Malaysian importers and exporters, this will 
clearly explain what we have found in the corollaries and proofs (1a, 1b, 2a and 2b) from the 
seller and buyer sections as a good example of the .   
 
 Globalization has led to many phenomena which have an impact on managerial 
decision-making and strategic reasoning in a business context. Among the uncertainties of 
business transactions across borders are risks with regards to international negotiations. There 
are menus of how to deal with people from or doing business in particular countries which 
cannot prevent misunderstandings. The break-up of negotiations and deals, which might have 
been successful in one’s own culture, show that the explanation comes from a much deeper 
cognitive level than any menu would suggest. The simple case of a short-term and long-term 
perspective of exporters and importers showed that the cultural behavioral patterns are linked to 
initial price offers, counter-offers, concessions, frequency of offer rejections and the costs of 
bargaining. The signaling effect of the initial price is a very powerful mechanism to prevent 
failure. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
 This paper analyzes the bargaining procedures of multi-active sellers and buyers 
in one-sided incomplete information games. The paper was structured into the literature 
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review, the description of international negotiation styles, the game trees (time lines), 
the models of uncertainty and multi-active bargaining in international negotiation 
analysis. The results of the games showed equilibrium types and a possibility to 
circumvent problems in international business negotiations which are related to 
different time perceptions and strategic behavior in this respect. It is important to 
anticipate the deadlocks, stalemates and even break-ups when bargaining with culturally 
programmed types. 
 
 In order to capture the specific characteristics of the multi-active types, we split 
the scenarios in seller-dominated situations either in which we know the first movers as 
multi-active or in which we had to randomize as LMR due to uncertainty, but in this 
case the second mover was a multi-active player. In the same way, we analyzed a buyer 
dominated perspective. This offers us the possibility to see the multi-active way of 
bargaining from various angles. Furthermore, we solved the problem of bargaining 
between the three types in an elegant way using corollaries to show the strategies of 
each type. We are now able to predict the culturally determined ways of moving in an 
international setting. The intuition behind the results shows that cultural patterns of 
offering, accepting and rejecting as well as counter-offering can lead to the anticipation 
of moves. Most importantly, we are able to see the value and costs of the bargaining 
process for the strategic moves of the players and their influence on the way proposals 
and counter-proposals are used.  
 
 This paper’s analysis offers an opportunity to see that multi-active types will 
continue bargaining when there is a linear-active bargainer who considers rejection as 
the end of the game or will accept at an earlier stage than the multi-active player. We 
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can call this ‘costs of cultural bargaining’. This is the case when the private values of 
the bargaining process are lower than the price offered. This occurs particularly when 
the multi-active seller offers first. Additionally, the multi-active bargaining horizon 
looks shorter in comparison with the reactive time perspective. In this case, the high 
frequency of rejection of the multi-active player will collide with a more patient 
approach and a lower concession rate of the reactive player. The bargaining strategies 
will, here, be leading to a deadlock, a break-up of negotiations or a relationship building 
process. The latter shows a more stable solution and an equilibrium in the long run.  
 
 Our model was applied to bargaining in a Bazaar which featured all three types 
and the outcome is in favor of a long-term approach. The limitations of the analysis are 
that we were using a field study example to analyze our theoretical outcomes. Future 
research can use this research design to investigate multi-active bargaining behavior in 
experiments.  
 
 Our results are not only useful for export and import negotiations, but also for 
negotiations in MNEs and international collaborations. The applicability to negotiations 
between MNEs with headquarters in multi-active European countries (i.e. Italy, Spain) 
and their hosts in the USA, Japan and China can lead to a better understanding between 
multi-active types in the HQs and linear-and/or reactive subsidiaries/hosts and vice 
versa for HQs based in linear-active or reactive cultures (USA, Japan, China) with 
subsidiaries in multi-active cultures (Southern Europe, Middle East, Latin America).  
 23 
References: 
 
Adair W.L.and Brett, J.M. 2004. Culture and negotiation process. In Gelfand, M.J., 
Brett J.M. (Eds), The Handbook of Negotiation and Culture. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 158-176. 
Adair, W.L. and Brett, J.M. 2005. The negotiation dance: Time, culture and behavioral 
sequences, Organization Science. 16, 33-51. 
Adair, W.L. Weingart, L.R., and Brett, J.M. 2007. The timing of offers and information 
exchange in US and Japanese negotiations, Journal of Applied Psychology. 92, 1056-
68. 
Adair, W.L., Taylor, M.S. and Tinsley, C.H. 2009. Starting out on the right foot: 
Negotiation schemas when cultures collide, Negotiation and Conflict Management 
Research. 2, 138-163. 
Adler, N.J., Graham, J.L. and Schwarz Gehrke, T. 1987. Business negotiations in 
Canada, Mexico and the United States, Journal of Business Research. 15: 411-429.  
Admati, A.R. and Perry, M. 1987. Strategic delay in bargaining, Review of Economic 
Studies. 345-364. 
Ausubel, L.M. and Deneckere, R.J. 1989a. A direct mechanism characterization of 
sequential bargaining with one-sided incomplete information, Journal of Economic 
Theory. 46, 18-46. 
Ausubel, L.M. and Deneckere, R.J. 1989b. Reputation in bargaining and durable goods 
monopoly, Econometrica. 57, 511-531. 
Balakrishnan, P.V. and Eliashberg, J. 1995. An analytical process model of two-party 
negotiations, Management Science. 41, 226-243. 
Bartos, O. 1978. A simple model of negotiation. In I.W. Zartmann (Ed). The negotiation 
process: Theory and applications, London: Sage Publications, 13-28. 
Brett, J.M. and Okumura, T.1998. Inter- and intracultural negotiations: US and Japanese 
negotiators, Academy of Management Journal. 41, 495-510. 
Calabuig, V. and Olcina, G. 2009. Cooperation and cultural transmission in a 
coordination game, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 72, 188-201. 
Cason, T., Friedman, D. and Milam, G. 2003. Bargaining versus posted price 
competition in customer markets. International Journal of Industrial Organization. 
21, 223-251. 
 24 
Chaney, L.H. and Martin, J.S. 2004. Intercultural Business Communications, Upper 
Saddle River, NJ: Peason Education. 
Chatterjee, K. and Samuelson, W. 1983. Bargaining under incomplete information, 
Operations Research. 31, 835-851. 
Chuah, S.-H., R. Hoffmann, Jones, M. and Williams, G. 2007. Do cultures clash? 
Evidence from cross-national ultimatum game experiments, Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization. 64 35-48. 
Crampton, P. 1985. Sequential bargaining mechanism, Chapter 8 in A. Roth (Ed) Game 
Theoretic Models of Bargaining, Cambridge University Press, 149-180. 
Cordes, C., Richerson, P.J., McElreath, R. and Strimling, P. 2008. A naturalistic 
approach to the theory of the firm: The role of cooperation and cultural evolution, 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 68, 125-139.  
Deutsch, M. 1973. The resolution of conflict, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.  
Druckman, D. 2001. Turning points in international negotiations, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution. 45, 519-544. 
Ellingsen, T. and Johannesson, M. 2009. Time is not money, Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization. 72 96-102. 
Fang, T. 2006. From ‘onion’ to ‘ocean’: Paradox and change in national cultures, 
International Studies of Management & Organization. 35, 71-90. 
Fayerweather, J., and Kapoor, A. 1976. Strategy and negotiation for the international 
corporation, Cambridge, MA: Ballinger. 
Faizullaev, A. 2012. Bargaining lessons from the bazaar, Negotiation, Program on 
Negotiation. 15: 6-7. 
Francis, J.N.P. 1991. When in Rome? The effect of cultural adaptation on intercultural 
business negotiation, Journal of International Business Studies. 22, 403-428. 
Fudenberg, D., Levine, D. and Tirole, J. 1985. Infinite horizon models of bargaining 
with one-sided incomplete information, Chapter 5 in A. Roth (Ed) Game Theoretic 
Models of Bargaining, Cambridge University Press, 73-99. 
Gelfand, M.J. and Brett, J.M. 2004. The Handbook of negotiation and culture, Stanford: 
Stanford University Press. 
Ghauri, P.N. and Usunier, J.-C. 2003. International business negotiations. Oxford: 
Elsevier Ltd. (2nd edition). 
Graham, J. L. 1985. The influence of culture on the process of business negotiations: 
An exploratory study, Journal of International Business Studies. 16, 81-96. 
 25 
Graham, J.L. 1987. A theory of interorganizational negotiations, Research in Marketing 
9, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. 
Graham, J.L., Mintu, A. and Rodgers, W. 1994. Explorations of negotiation behaviour 
in 10 foreign cultures using a model developed in the United States, Management 
Science. 40, 72-95.  
Graham, J.L. and Mintu-Wimsat, A.1997. Culture’s influence on business negotiations 
in four countries, Group Decision and Negotiations. 9, 483-502. 
Gul, F. and Sonnenschein, H. 1985. Bargaining with one-sided uncertainty, Working 
Paper, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. 
Hall, E.T.1976. Beyond culture. Garden City: NY, Anchor.  
Hennig-Schmidt, H., Li, Z.Y. andYang, C. 2008. Why people reject advantageous offers 
– Non-monotonic strategies in ultimatum bargaining evaluating a video experiment 
run in PR China, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 65, 373-384. 
Hofstede, G. 1991. Cultures and organizations: Software of the mind. London: 
McGraw-Hill.  
Hofstede, G. 2001. Culture’s consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, institutions 
and organizations across nations, Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi: Sage 
Publications. 
Lee, K., Guang, Y. and Graham, J.L. 2006. Tension and trust in international business 
negotiations: American executives negotiating with Chinese executives, Journal of 
International Business Studies. 37, 623-641. 
Lewis, R. 2006. When cultures collide, London: Nicholas Brealey Publishing. 
Milam, G. 2006. A laboratory study of haggling with deadlines, International Journal of 
Industrial Organization. 24, 505-520. 
Moran, R.T. and Stripp, W.G. 1991. Dynamics of successful international business 
negotiations, Houston: Gulf Publishing.  
Muthoo, A. 1999. Bargaining theory with application, Cambridge University Press. 
Myerson R. 1985. Analysis of two bargaining problems with incomplete information, 
Chapter 7 in A.Roth (Ed.) Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining, Cambridge 
University Press, 115-148. 
Myerson R. and Satterthwaite, M.A. 1983. Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading, 
Journal of Economic Theory. 29, 265-281.  
Olekalns, M. and Weingart, L.R. 2008. Emergent negotiations: Stability and shifts in 
negotiation dynamics, Negotiation and Conflict Management Research. 1, 135-160. 
 26 
Ott, U.F. 2011. The influence of cultural activity types on buyer-seller negotiations - A 
game theoretic framework for intercultural negotiations, International Negotiation. 
16, 427-450. 
Phillips, O.R. and Menkhaus, D.J. 2010. The culture of private negotiation: Endogenous 
price anchors in simple bilateral bargaining experiments. Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization. 76, 705-715. 
Pruitt, D.G. 1981. Negotiation behavior, New York: Academic Press 
Raiffa, H. 1982. The art and science of negotiation, Cambridge, MA: Belknap. 
Raiffa, H., Richarson, J., and Metcalfe, D. 2002. Negotiation analysis - The science and 
art of negotiation of collective decision-making. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Rapoport, A., Erev, I., and Zwick, R. 1995. An experimental study of buyer-seller 
negotiation with one-sided incomplete information and time discounting, 
Management Science. 41, 377-394. 
Robinson, R.J., Lewicki, R. J. and Donahue, E.M. 2000. Extending and testing a five 
factor model of ethical and unethical bargaining tactics: introducing the SINS scale, 
Journal of Organizational Behavior. 21, 649-664. 
Rubinstein A. 1982. Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model, Econometrica. 50, 97-
109.  
Rubinstein A. 1985. A bargaining model with incomplete information about time 
preferences, Econometrica. 53, 242-263. 
Salacuse, J.W. 1999. Intercultural negotiations in international business, Group 
Decision and Negotiations. 8, 217-236. 
Schelling, T. 1960. Strategy of conflict. London: Oxford University Press.  
Seale, D.A., Daniel, T.E., and Rapoport, A. 2001. The information advantage in two-
person bargaining with incomplete information, Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization. 44, 177-200. 
Sebenius, J.K. 1992. Negotiation analysis: A characterization and review, Management 
Science. 38, 18-38. 
Sebenius, J.K. 2009. Negotiation analysis: From games to inferences to decisions to 
deals, Negotiation Journal. 25, 449-466. 
Shaked, A. 1994. Opting out: Bazaars versus ‘Hi-Tech’ markets, Investigaciones 
Economicas. 18, 421-432. 
 27 
Thompson, L., Neale, M. and Sinaceur, M. 2004. The evolution of cognition and biases 
in negotiation research, in M. J. Gelfand, J. M. Brett (Eds), The Handbook of 
Negotiation and Culture, Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Tung, R. 1982. US-China trade negotiations: Practices, procedures and outcomes, 
Journal of International Business Studies. 13, 25-37.  
Tung, R.L., Worm, V. and Fang, T. 2008. Sino-Western business negotiations revisited 
– 30 years after China’s open door policy, Organization Dynamics. 37, 60-74.  
Usunier, J.C. 2003a. Cultural aspects of international business negotiations, In Ghauri, 
P.N. and Usunier, J.-C. International Business Negotiations. Oxford: Elsevier Ltd., 
97-136. 
Usunier, J.C. 2003b. The role of time in international business negotiations, In Ghauri, 
P.N. and Usunier, J.-C. International Business Negotiations. Oxford: Elsevier Ltd., 
171-203.  
Volkema, R. 1999. Ethicality in negotiations: An analysis of perceptual similarities and 
differences between Brazil and the United States, Journal of Business Research. 45: 
59-67.  
Volkema, R. 2004. Demographic, cultural and economic predictors of perceived 
ethicality of negotiation behaviour: A nine-country analysis, Journal of Business 
Research. 57: 69-78.  
 28 
TABLES: 
TABLE 1: Empirical Evidence of Cultural Activity Types 
Properties Linear-active  
USA 
Multi-active  
Brazil 
Reactive 
Japan 
Authors 
First offer  Ask for fair price, 
close to eventual 
solution 
 
 
+5-10% 
Priority 
information 
sharing likely and 
directly 
 
Ask for more 
initially 
 
 
 
+20-50% 
Ask for higher 
profit solutions 
when making 
initial offer 
+10-20% 
Priority 
information 
sharing less likely 
and indirectly 
Graham (1985) 
 
 
 
Chaney and Martin 
(2004) 
 
Adair and Brett 
2004 and 2005) 
Second offer*  
 
Add to package to 
sweeten the deal 
-10% -5% Chaney and Martin 
(2004) 
 
Final offer* Total package -25% No concessions Chaney and Martin 
(2004) 
Four stages Low context 
reciprocate offers 
less and priority 
information more 
 High context 
reciprocate offers 
more and priority 
information less 
Adair, Weingart 
and Brett (2007) 
Concessions Longer initial 
concessions 
 
Early concessions 
Initial 
concessions are 
higher 
More commands 
 Graham (1985) 
 
Bartos (1978) 
 
 
Silence  3.5/30 minutes none 5.5./30 minutes Graham (1985) 
Word ‘No’ Less frequent use 
of the word no 
High frequency 
of the use of no;  
not answer to a 
question 
Less frequent use 
of the word no.  
Graham (1985) 
Disagreement 
Rates: % of  offers 
rejected  
 
28% 
 
29% 
 
22% 
Roth et al (1991) 
Profits American buyers 
achieve higher 
profits than sellers 
 Japanese buyers 
achieve higher 
profits than 
sellers 
Graham and 
Mintu-Wimsat 
(1992) 
Contract Contract means 
closing deal 
Primary Goal is 
relationship and 
not contract  
Contract means 
opening 
relationship 
Salacuse (1999) 
Time sensitivity 85% of 
Americans 
linear, economic 
time 
100% of 
Brazilians 
91% Japanese 
 
cyclical-
integrated time 
Salacuse (1999) 
 
Usunier (2003) 
 
Sources: Ott (2011) 
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TABLE 2: Buyer-Seller Model for Different Cultures in Intercultural negotiations 
 
  Buyer 
 
Seller  
Buyer (Player II) 
 
Linear-activeCulture       Multi-activeCulture          
Re-activeCulture 
      
 
Linear-active  
culture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Seller  
(Player I)    
      Multi-
active  
culture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            
Reactive  
Culture 
Similar 
cultural 
background with  
refinements  
Scenario1 
Example: 
American 
Seller – German 
buyer 
‘Time is 
Money’ – 
Approach 
);( LLLL pvcp   
Seller 
linear-active and 
buyer  multi-
active 
Scenario 4 
Example:  
American 
Seller – 
Brazilian buyer 
);( MMLL pvcp 
 
Seller linear-
active and 
Buyer reactive 
Scenario 5 
Example:  
American 
Seller – Japanese 
buyer 
 
);( RRLL pvcp   
Seller multi-
active and buyer 
linear- active 
Scenario 6 
Example:  
Brazilian 
Seller – American 
buyer 
 
);( LLMM pvcp 
 
 
Similar 
cultural 
background 
with 
refinements  
Scenario 2 
Example: 
Arab Seller – 
Brazilian buyer 
‘Haggling’-
Approach 
);( MMMM pvcp 
 
Seller multi-
active and buyer 
reactive 
Scenario 7 
Example:  
Brazilian 
Seller – Japanese 
buyer 
 
 
 
);( RRMM pvcp 
 
Seller reactive 
and buyer  
Linear-active 
Scenario 8 
Example: 
Japanese Seller – 
American buyer 
 
);( LLRR pvcp   
Seller 
reactive 
And buyer  
Multi-
active 
Scenario 9 
Example: 
Japanese Seller 
– Brazilian 
buyer 
 
);( MMRR pvcp 
 
Similar 
cultural 
background with 
refinement 
Scenario 3 
Example: 
Japanese Seller – 
Finnish buyer 
‘Building 
trust’-Approach 
);( RRRR pvcp   
Source: Ott (2011) 
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TABLE 3:  Summary of multi-active bargaining behavior 
 
SELLER -
OFFER 
Finding Intuition 
Proposition 1: 
If 
M
S
M pU  , 
then sequential 
Reservation price for buyer 
to accept 
Corollary 1a: ML pv )(  
Corollary1b: MM pv )(  
Corollary 1c: MR pv )(  
Private value of the bargaining process 
is: 
Lower value of bargaining for linear-
active 
Similar value for multi-actives 
Higher value of bargaining for reactive 
BUYER -
OFFER 
  
Proposition 2: 
If 
M
B
M pU  , 
then sequential 
Reservation price for seller 
to accept 
Corollary 2a: )( LM cp   
Corollary 2b: )( MM cp   
Corollary 2c: )( RM cp   
Private value of the strategic 
delay/concessions: 
 
Lower costs for linear-actives 
Similar level of costs for multi-actives 
Higher costs for reactive 
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FIGURES: 
 
 
Multi-Actives Haggling  
                                                                    Cooperation 
Initial Offer Negotiation Process Outcome 
 Conflict 
Linear-Actives Hurrying – Time is Money 
Reactives Holding On –Trust-building 
 
Figure1: Conceptual framework for multi-active bargaining behavior 
 
Price offers 
 
Seller pM 
  
 
 
Buyer pL 
 PR 
 pM 
 
  
L  M  R       Time   
Figure 2: Multi-active Seller negotiates with LMR buyer 
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Price offers 
 
Seller pM 
 pR 
 pL 
 
Buyer  
 
 pM 
 
  
L   M  R
 Time  
Figure:3: Multi-active Buyer negotiates with LMR seller 
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Proposals 
 
Exporter Malaysia PM 
      
Exporter UK PL 
 
Importer UK pL 
  
Importer M pM 
 
  
öL δL,M δM,L, δM Time δ 
Figure 4: Application to the Malaysia-UK experiment 
 
